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Twenty-Five Years in Search of a
Reasonable Approach
Michal Fairburn*

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last quarter-century, the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms1 has proven to be fertile ground for litigation. Nowhere is this
more true than in the context of police powers of search. In 1984,
Hunter v. Southam2 taught us that section 8 of the Charter and the right
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure was an individual
right grounded in privacy and not property interests. Hunter placed a
protective Charter cloak over all reasonable expectations of privacy. We
learned that in order to penetrate that cloak, state actors had first to
obtain prior judicial authorization and that a failure to do so would result
in a presumptively unreasonable search. Since Hunter, much judicial
energy has been invested in developing a meaningful construct by which
to locate the line between a reasonable and unreasonable expectation of
privacy. As the years have passed and the courts have stamped creative
investigative techniques with a privacy label, we have seen a corresponding
proliferation of search provisions in the Criminal Code.3 While Parliament
must be commended for attempting to keep stride with the evolution of
section 8 Charter rulings, the ongoing dialogue between the courts and
Parliament has resulted in nothing short of a complex labyrinth of Criminal
Code provisions that have become virtually impossible to navigate and
more difficult to apply. Police officers often find themselves spending
more time debating which search provisions apply to their investigative
techniques and the parameters of their constitutional requirements than
involved in the investigation itself. Twenty-five years later, it is time to
*
Counsel, Crown Law Office Criminal. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of her employer, the Attorney General for Ontario.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “the Charter”].
2
Canada (Combines Investigation Act, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam
Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”].
3
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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pause, catch our breath, and think about how the administration of justice,
the community at large and individual Charter interests can be best served
going forward.

II. IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS SECTION 487 OF THE
CRIMINAL CODE
Section 487 of the Criminal Code4 is the most commonly resorted to
provision by which to gain prior judicial authorization to search. It has
existed since the beginning of time ― well, at least since the beginning
of the Criminal Code.5 While it was amended periodically over the years,
the core essence of section 487 has remained unchanged. In the beginning,
it required that before a warrant issue, there exist reasonable grounds to
believe that there were, in a named location, things that would “afford
evidence as to the commission” of an offence.6 In its current formulation,
section 487(1)(b) of the Code requires that there exist reasonable grounds
to believe that an offence has been or is being committed and that there
exists, in a specific location, “anything” that “will afford evidence with
respect to the commission of an offence”.7 Assuming these criteria are
met, a warrant may issue permitting the search of a “building, receptacle
or place for any such thing and to seize it”.8
Life was simple back in 1892 when what is now section 487 was
first enacted and stood as the beacon for prior judicial authorization.
After all, there was no need for anything more. The expression “search
and seizure” had an obvious meaning back in pre-Charter days. It meant
looking for, locating and taking away tangible items. Before the turn of
the 20th century and, indeed, well into it, no one would have imagined
that a request for mere information would constitute a “search” or
4

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29.
6
Section 569 of the Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c. 29. It has been amended over the years by:
R.S.C. 1906, c. 146; S.C. 1909, c. 9; R.S.C. 1927, c. 36; S.C. 1953-54, c. 51; R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34;
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1st Supp.) s. 68; S.C. 1994, c. 44, s. 36; S.C. 1997, c. 23,
s. 12; S.C. 1997, c. 18, s. 41; S.C. 1999, c. 5, s. 16.
7
In CanadianOxy Chemicals Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 87,
133 C.C.C. (3d) 426, at para. 13 (S.C.C.) Major J., for the Court, offered these words an expansive
interpretation, meaning anything relevant or rationally connected to the offence under investigation.
Today, s. 487(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 also permits the search for and
seizure of a thing where there are reasonable grounds to believe it will “reveal the whereabouts of a
person who is believed to have committed an offence ...”.
8
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487(1)(d).
5
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“seizure”.9 The term “biographical core of personal information” had
not been coined.10 Computers had not been invented and so non-tangible
electronic data did not challenge the outside parameters of the precursor
to section 487. Tracking devices, digital number recorders, and pinhole
video cameras were not even the things of science fiction novels, let
alone part of the investigator’s tool kit. Who would have known that
individuals held a genetic fingerprint in their bodily substances and
how critically important that genetic fingerprint would become to the
administration of justice?11 Come to think of it, fingerprints were not
even introduced into the Canadian law enforcement world until the 20th
century. Yes, life was simple back then. It has taken a turn.

III. SECTION 8 OF THE CHARTER AND THE AGE OF
INVESTIGATIVE INNOVATION
After the Charter’s proclamation in 1982, it did not take long for
section 8 to achieve a special and sustained spotlight in the Supreme
Court of Canada. The Court quickly set to work on providing meaningful
content to the 12 simple words: “Everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search and seizure.” In its 1984 Hunter v. Southam12
debut, Dickson J., as he then was, decided that, barring some compelling
reason, section 8 protected reasonable expectations of privacy from the
state’s prying eyes. As the years passed, the court provided necessary
guidance on how to identify section 8 privacy protected interests. To
name but a few, cases like R. v. Edwards, R. v. Duarte and R. v. Tessling
represent valiant attempts by the Court to provide a lens through which
to determine whether a Charter protected privacy interest exists.13 While
our understanding of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of
9

R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203 (S.C.C.).
This expression is taken from R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203,
at 212-13 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.
11
The introduction of forensic DNA to the criminal justice system has served to identify
both the innocent and the guilty. Names like David Milgaard, Guy Paul Morin and Thomas
Sophonow resonate as examples of those who have been fully exonerated as a result of forensic
DNA. See: R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 51 (S.C.C.) per
Arbour J.; R. v. Briggs, [2001] O.J. No. 3339, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 38, at paras. 22-23 (Ont. C.A.)
per Weiler J.A., leave to appeal refused [2002] S.C.C.A. No. 31 (S.C.C.).
12
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
13
R. v. Edwards, [1996] S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136 (S.C.C.); R. v. Duarte, [1990]
S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 189 C.C.C. (3d) 129
(S.C.C.).
10
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privacy and how to arrive at that determination has evolved over the
years, there is bound to be further clarification of this important concept
in the years to come.14
For now, while peering through the privacy lens, we know that the
courts have arrived at a liberal construction for privacy which goes well
beyond what was historically considered protected. The birth of Charter
protected informational privacy in R. v. Plant, in 1993, left no doubt
about the fact that the Supreme Court was willing to stretch the limit
beyond our traditional understanding of privacy. In what has become an
oft-quoted passage, Sopinka J. observed:
... In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy,
it is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical
core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic
society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the
state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual. 15

Today, this “liberal approach to the protection of privacy” is firmly
embedded in section 8 jurisprudence.16
It did not take long to realize that the Criminal Code17 was ill equipped
to accommodate this expansive approach to privacy. Given the Hunter v.
Southam18 conclusion that searches impressing themselves on reasonable
expectations of privacy would be presumptively unreasonable, barring
prior judicial authorization, suddenly section 487 was not enough.19 This

14
Distilled, the current approach takes into account the totality of the circumstances,
including consideration of any subjective expectation of privacy held by the individual asserting the
privacy interest and the objective reasonableness of that expectation. (See R. v. Edwards, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 11, 104 C.C.C. (3d) 136, at 150-51 (S.C.C.), per Cory J.) We are very likely to benefit
from the Court’s expanded views on this issue in two cases currently under reserve in the Supreme
Court of Canada: R. v. M. (A.), [2006] S.C.J. No. 1663, 208 C.C.C. (3d) 438 (Ont. C.A.), leave to
appeal granted [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 229 (S.C.C.); R. v. Brown, [2006] A.J. No. 755, 210 C.C.C.
(3d) 317 (Alta. C.A.), motion to extend time granted [2006] S.C.C.A. No. 323 (S.C.C.).
15
R. v. Plant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203, at 212-13 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J.
16
R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras. 15-16 (S.C.C.), per
Bastarache J.
17
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
18
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
19
There are, of course, some warrantless searches that can overtake the presumption of
unreasonableness, including: abandonment (R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321
(S.C.C.); R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.)); consent (R. v. Borden,
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.)); exigent circumstances (R. v. Grant, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 98, 84 C.C.C. (3d) 173 (S.C.C.)); search incident to arrest (R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49,
185 C.C.C. (3d) 308 (S.C.C.); R. v. Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.)); and
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raised the question, what would be enough? Judicial authorization, but
informed by what? According to Dickson J. in Hunter, the answer to
that question lay in the context of the search. What might be enough in
one context, might not be in another. He put it this way:
... Section 443 [now section 487] of the Criminal Code authorizes a
warrant only where there has been information upon oath that there is
“reasonable ground to believe” that there is evidence of an offence in
the place to be searched. ... The state’s interest in detecting and preventing
crime begins to prevail over the individual’s interest in being left alone
at the point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion. History
has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement as the threshold
for subordinating the expectation of privacy to the needs of law
enforcement. Where in the state’s interest is not simply law enforcement
as, for instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s
interest is not simply his expectation of privacy, as for instance, when
the search threatens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might
well be a different one. ...20

So it was, with these words, that the contextual approach to prior
judicial authorization was born. It was restated by Wilson J. a few years
later in R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd. as follows:
Since individuals have different expectations of privacy in different
contexts and with regard to different kinds of information and documents,
it follows that the standard of review of what is ‘reasonable’ in a given
context must be flexible if it is to be realistic and meaningful. 21

Sometimes, reasonable grounds to believe certain facts would
suffice to get a warrant. When that threshold test met constitutional
standards, the state’s interest would prevail over the individual’s privacy
interest when “credibly based probability” replaced suspicion. But, this
threshold test would not always be required. Other contexts may permit
the constitutionalization of a suspicion standard. Yet others may require
more than simple belief. Time would tell.
As the common law has evolved in the post-Charter era, and the
courts have found section 8 privacy interests adversely impacted by a
constellation of investigative techniques and police powers, the need to
provide the jurisdiction for prior authorization has become a not-infrequent
search incident to investigative detention (R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 220 C.C.C. (3d) 449
(S.C.C.)).
20
Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 114-15 (S.C.C.).
21
R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 530, at 542-43 (S.C.C.).
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challenge for Parliament. In an effort to either pre-empt or quickly respond
to section 8 decisions, Parliament has taken a contextual approach to
setting out the requirements for such authorization. This has led to a
remarkable proliferation of search provisions in the Criminal Code.22 As
noted by Rosenberg J.A. in R. v. Backhouse:
Since proclamation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms there has
been an explosion of legislative activity in the field of search and
seizure. In Hunter v. Southam, [cite omitted] the Supreme Court of
Canada held that warrantless searches for purposes of criminal
investigation are presumptively unreasonable and in R. v. Collins the
Court held that for a search to be reasonable it must be authorized by
law. In the result, Parliament has moved quickly to fill in gaps in the
legislative scheme of search and seizure to provide the police with the
necessary tools to investigate crime while ensuring that the public and
individual interests in privacy are adequately protected.23

Unfortunately, the different search provisions are sometimes
inconsistent and difficult to reconcile. What follows is a discussion of
specific examples of section 8 Charter dialogue between the courts and
Parliament and how that dialogue has been, in part, responsible for the
maze of search provisions we have today. It is followed by some,
hopefully, practical observations about how Parliament might start to
rejig these provisions in a manner that, while staying true to section 8
interests, brings clarity and some level of simplicity to the Criminal
Code.24

IV. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. DUARTE AND THEN THERE WERE
PARTICIPANT SURVEILLANCE AUTHORIZATIONS
Prior to R. v. Duarte,25 while Part VI of the Criminal Code26 allowed
for judicial authorization for electronic surveillance of third parties,
22
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. I am not the first person to have written on this subject and trust I
will not be the last. For an earlier excellent discussion of the confusion that reigns in the many
search provisions in the Criminal Code, with a particular focus on ss. 487 and 487.01 warrants, and
a “modest” proposal for change, see Renee Pomerance, “Criminal Code Search Warrants: A Plea
for a New Generic Warrant” in Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law, Don Stuart, R.J. Delisle &
Allan Manson, eds. (Scarborough, ON: Carswell 1999). See also Kent Roach’s illuminating discussion in
“Constitutional and Common Law Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures”
(2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481.
23
[2005] O.J. No. 754, 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at para. 110 (Ont. C.A.).
24
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
25
[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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there was no Code provision allowing for an authorization to permit
intercepts of conversations where there was a consenting party.27 There
was a strong basis upon which to suggest that section 8 did not apply as,
some thought, a person could not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a conversation that he or she had with another person. After
all, the recipient of those words could simply repeat them at will. The
intercept would be nothing more than an accurate recording of those
words and, ergo, allow for an accurate recounting of the conversation.28
As noted by Cory J.A., as he then was, in the court below, “the admission
of electronic recordings of those conversations would seem to be a
reasonable, logical and sequential step in trial proceedings.” Indeed, he
made the practical observation that an “accurate transcript of the
conversation should so often benefit the accused as the informant”.29
The Court of Appeal was in good company in arriving at this
conclusion. It had on its side the United States Supreme Court. In Lopez
v. United States the following words were used to describe participant
surveillance:
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner’s argument amounts to saying that
he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in the agent’s
memory, or to challenge the agent’s credibility without being beset by
corroborating evidence that is not susceptible of impeachment. For no
other argument can justify excluding an accurate version of a conversation
that the agent could testify to from memory. 30

This position was rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada. In his
oft-quoted passage, La Forest J. emphasized the highly intrusive nature
of all electronic surveillance, regardless of who may be consenting to its
interception:
The very efficacy of electronic surveillance is such that it has the
potential, if left unregulated, to annihilate any expectation that our
26

Then Part IV.1 of the Criminal Code.
This type of technique is often referred to as “consent” or “participant” surveillance.
Typically, an undercover police officer or state agent will be a party to a communication which he
or she consents to being electronically captured.
28
This is most likely the rationale behind exempting a consenting person (including a state
actor) from the offence provision within s. 184(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
Section 184(2)(a) ensures that a consenting party to a communication (either the originator or the
recipient of the communication) may wilfully intercept that communication without committing an
offence. See R. v. Goldman, [1979] S.C.J. No. 136, 13 C.R. (3d) 228 (S.C.C.).
29
R. v. Duarte, [1987] O.J. No. 821, 38 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 10 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1990] S.C.J.
No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
30
373 U.S. 427, at 438-39 (1963).
27
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communications will remain private. A society which exposed us, at
the whim of the state, to the risk of having a permanent electronic
recording made of our words every time we opened our mouths might
be superbly equipped to fight crime, but would be one in which
privacy no longer had any meaning. As Douglas J., dissenting in
United States v. White, supra, put it, at p. 756: “Electronic surveillance
is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.” If the state may
arbitrarily record and transmit our private communications, it is no
longer possible to strike an appropriate balance between the right of
the individual to be left alone and the right of the state to intrude on
privacy in the furtherance of its goals, notably the need to investigate
and combat crime.31

With this approach to electronic surveillance, it is not surprising that
La Forest J., for the Court, recognized that while the Charter cannot
protect people from their friends repeating their words, it must protect
them from permanent recordings of their conversations with their
“friends”.32 Individuals must be protected, not from the state repeating
their words, but from the “much more insidious danger inherent in
allowing the state, in its unfettered discretion, to record and transmit our
words”.33 In the end, La Forest J. concluded that it would be “unacceptable
in a free society that the agencies of the state be free to use this technology
at their sole discretion” as it would pose a “wholly unacceptable” threat
to privacy.34
Parliament responded to the call for prior judicial authorization with
section 184.2 of the Criminal Code.35 This became the means by which
to gain authorization to intercept communications where at least one
party to the communication was consenting to its capture. Parliament
approached the legislative exercise by taking into account the specific
privacy interests at play. In doing so, despite the strong dicta from R. v.
31

R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (S.C.C.). It is not without some
irony that La Forest J. places emphasis on the passage from United States v. White, 201 U.S. 745
(1971) to demonstrate the highly intrusive nature of electronic surveillance when, in fact, in the
United States, there is no prior authorization needed to capture a communication where at least one
party consents to its capture.
32
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (S.C.C.).
33
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 11 (S.C.C.).
34
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1, at 13-14 (S.C.C.).
35
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 4. At the same time that s. 184.2 was
proclaimed in force, so were officer lifelines and emergency wires: ss. 184.1 and 184.4 of the Code
respectively. In brief compass, these provisions specifically allow for non-judicially authorized
electronic surveillance in situations where serious bodily harm may result to a consenting party,
usually a police officer or police agent, or to a victim of crime, and there is insufficient time to
obtain a judicial authorization.
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Duarte,36 one would be forgiven for thinking that Parliament was
somewhat swayed by what it considered to be a diminished expectation
of privacy for the person caught speaking to the consenting party. As
such, while it responded to the Duarte call for legislation to permit prior
authorization, Parliament chose to deal with participant surveillance
differently than a full blown third party authorization to intercept private
communications where there is no consenting party. The fluctuating
privacy interest has led to dramatically different application and
authorization requirements.
The requirements for third party authorizations are governed by
sections 185 and 186 of the Criminal Code37 and it is beyond the scope
of this paper to study them in full. Suffice it to say that the statutory
criteria surrounding the application and issuance process for a third
party authorization contains the most robust requirements within the
Criminal Code. A third party application requires that the applicant, a
specially designated agent of the Attorney General or Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, bring the application before a
superior court judge, accompanied by an affidavit setting out a peace
officer’s grounds to believe a number of factors enumerated in section
185(c)-(h). An application may only be brought in respect of an offence
designated for such a purpose in section 183 of the Code. The authorization
may issue where the judge is satisfied that “it would be in the best
interests of the administration of justice to do so” (see s. 186(1)(a)) and
where it meets the requirements of investigative necessity. Interestingly,
section 186 of the Code is missing a threshold test for the issuance of
the authorization. Unlike most other search provisions in the Code that
require the issuing justice to be satisfied on reasonable grounds of some
nature, section 186 only speaks in terms of the judge being satisfied that
the “best interests of the administration of justice” would be served by
allowing the authorization. In R. v. Finlay Martin J.A. interpreted these
words to be mutually inclusive, in this context, with a reasonable grounds
to believe standard:
... Thus, it appears to me that the prerequisite that the judge must be
satisfied that it would be in the best interests of the administration of
justice to grant the authorization, the context of the legislative scheme,
imports as a minimum requirement that the authorizing judge must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a particular
36
37

[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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offence or a conspiracy, attempt or incitement to commit it has been,
or is being, committed.38

In terms of the investigative necessity requirement, section 186(1)(b)
of the Code requires that the applicant establish that “other investigative
procedures have been tried and have failed, other investigative procedures
are unlikely to succeed or the urgency of the matter is such that it would
be impractical to carry out the investigation of the offence using only
other investigative procedures”. In R. v. Araujo LeBel J. held that
“investigative necessity” means that “[t]here must be, practically speaking,
no other reasonable alternative method of investigation, in the circumstances
of the particular criminal inquiry.”39
By way of contrast, the post-Duarte40 requirements for an authorization
permitting participant surveillance rest on simple reasonable grounds to
believe that any Criminal Code41 or federal offence has been or will be
committed, that there is a consenting party to the interception of the
communication and that “information” concerning the offence will be
obtained through the interception. The application can be made by a
peace or public officer to a provincial court judge. Importantly, there is
no requirement for investigative necessity.
In its response to R. v. Duarte,42 Parliament gave officers section 184.2
to permit participant surveillance to continue with proper authorization.
Clearly, they did not feel that this type of authorization was as pressing
on privacy interests as a full-blown third party authorization. In the end,
while Parliament required that participant surveillance comply with a
Hunter v. Southam43 reasonable grounds to believe threshold, it evidently
revealed its perception of the different constitutional context for this
type of interference with privacy. It did this by eliminating investigative
necessity and Crown agents from the formula, as well as permitting an
authorization to be issued by a provincial court judge for any Criminal
Code44 or federal offence that had been or might be committed in the

38
[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48, at 70-71 (Ont. C.A.), per Martin J.A., leave to
appeal refused [1986] 1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
39
[2000] S.C.J. No. 65, 149 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 29 (S.C.C.), per LeBel J.
40
R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
41
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
42
[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
43
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
44
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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future.45 These are fundamentally different legislative provisions, informed
by, what Parliament perceived to be, fundamentally different constitutional
standards.

V. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. WONG AND THEN THERE WERE
VIDEO-WARRANTS
Mr. Wong was engaged in illegal gambling in a hotel room. With
the permission of the hotel, the police installed video equipment in the
room and, on a number of occasions, monitored it from the adjacent
room. They did this without prior authorization. After all, there was
none to be had. Close on the heels of R. v. Duarte,46 La Forest J., on behalf
of the majority, concluded that the unauthorized video-surveillance used
in R. v. Wong47 constituted a section 8 Charter breach. He did not mince
words in setting out his vision of the Orwellian world we would live in
if state actors could decide, on their own, when to videotape the activities
of citizens:
I am firmly of the view that if a free and open society cannot brook the
prospect that the agents of the state should, in the absence of judicial
authorization, enjoy the right to record the words of whomever they
choose, it is equally inconceivable that the state should have
unrestricted discretion to target whomever it wishes for surreptitious
video surveillance. George Orwell in his classic dystopian novel, 1984,
paints a grim picture of a society whose citizens had every reason to
expect that their every movement was subject to electronic video
surveillance. The contrast with the expectations of privacy in a free
society such as our own could not be more striking. The notion that the
agencies of the state should be at liberty to train hidden cameras on
members of society wherever and whenever they wish is fundamentally
irreconcilable with what we perceive to be acceptable behaviour on the
part of government. ... we must always be alert to the fact that modern

45
In R. v. Bordage, [2000] J.Q. no 2045, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 549, at paras. 36-40 (Que. C.A.),
the constitutionality of s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 and, specifically, the
absence of an investigative necessity requirement, was upheld. See also the comments of
Deschênes J.A. for the court in R. v. Doiron, [2007] N.B.J. No. 189, 221 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at paras.
43-45 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Gyles, [2005] O.J. No. 5513 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Pires, [2005] S.C.J. No. 67,
201 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at para. 21 (S.C.C.).
46
[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
47
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.).
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methods of electronic surveillance have the potential, if uncontrolled,
to annihilate privacy.48

This passage has far-reaching effects. At first glance, it leaves the
impression that La Forest J. was of the view that, like R. v. Duarte,49
prior authorization was required any time the state wished to electronically
record the citizen. He later qualified his comments by suggesting that
the question for consideration was whether “in a society such as ours
persons who retire to a hotel room and close the door behind them have
a reasonable expectation of privacy”.50 Unlike Duarte, then, La Forest J.
was prepared to accept that the police were only precluded from capturing
individuals on videotape where they were involved in activity in an
environment where they had a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the
end, he concluded that Mr. Wong had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the hotel room set up for the gambling activity.51 In observing
that no legislative mechanism existed for video-surveillance authorizations,
La Forest J. commented on the role of the legislature: it is for
“Parliament, and Parliament alone, to set out the conditions under which
law enforcement agencies may employ video surveillance technology”.52
Parliament did not take long to respond. They chose a questionable
manner in which to do so. The general warrant was proclaimed in force
shortly after R. v. Wong.53 The general warrant provision, section 487.01,
located in Part XV of the Criminal Code54 (where most of the search
provisions are located) allows a judge of the provincial or superior court
to issue a warrant permitting an officer to “use any device or investigative
technique or procedure or do any thing described in the warrant that
would, if not authorized, constitute an unreasonable search or seizure in
respect of a person or a person’s property”. This provision filled a void
left by section 487 of the Code, permitting officers to engage in
investigative activity touching on section 8 privacy interests, but not
involving a search for tangible items. Bearing in mind that section 487
48

R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 478-79 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 2, 53 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
50
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 481 (S.C.C.).
51
Chief Justice Lamer and McLachlin J. (as she then was) dissented on this point, finding that,
in the circumstances of this case, the hotel room being used for a gambling operation where numerous and
open invitations were out in the public to attend, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.
52
R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460, at 486 (S.C.C.).
53
An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the
Radiocommunication Act, S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 15. R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460
(S.C.C.).
54
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
49
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of the Code only permitted the seizure of a “thing”,55 with the emphasis
on prior judicial authorization in the post-Charter era, there was a clear
need for the general warrant to accommodate those investigative activities
that involved an intersection with privacy interests but did not result in
officers walking away with tangible seizures.
Interestingly, what has been dubbed the “general warrant” in section
487.01, requires that the “best interests of the administration of justice”
be met before the warrant issue. No such requirement exists in section
487 of the Code.56 Presumably, this was an effort by Parliament to
recognize a broader invasion of privacy that could be triggered by the
use of one of these warrants. What is curious is that it is not entirely
clear what the “best interests” requirement means in the context of the
general warrant. We know from R. v. Finlay,57 that the requirement in
section 186(1)(a) of the Code means reasonable grounds to believe that
an offence has been or is being committed, and that the use of the
investigative technique will assist in advancing the investigation. But,
section 487.01(1)(a), the general warrant provision, already articulates a
reasonable grounds to believe threshold test. A provincial or superior
court judge (not justice of the peace) must have reasonable grounds to
believe that an offence against the Criminal Code58 or any other Act of
Parliament “has been or will be committed”. In Finlay, Martin J.A. went
on to suggest that the “best interests of the administration of justice” test
in section 186(1)(a), beyond incorporating a reasonable grounds standard,
also required a delicate balance to be achieved between competing interests.
As he noted:
... Although the term “in the best interests of the administration of
justice” is incapable of precise definition it imports, in my view, in the
context, two readily identifiable and mutually supportive components.
The first component is that the judge must be satisfied that the granting
of the authorization will further or advance the objectives of justice.

55

Section 487(1)(d) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
There are other differences between the provisions, including that a general warrant
cannot be issued by a justice of the peace. As well, a general warrant cannot issue unless, pursuant
to s. 487.01(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, “there is no other provision in this or
any other Act of Parliament that would provide for a warrant, authorization or order permitting the
technique, procedure or device to be used or the thing to be done”.
57
[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986]
1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
58
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
56
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The second component imports a balancing of the interests of law
enforcement and the individual’s interest in privacy.59

As noted by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Bernardo, the phrase, “interests
of justice” is found throughout the Code and simply suggests judicial
discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case basis, balancing societal and
individual interests.60 These comments, and those of Martin J.A. in R. v.
Finlay,61 have a distinct section 8 ring to them. They suggest that the
phrase requires a judicial officer to engage in a final balancing of
individual and state interests before issuing process. These words, then,
dovetail with section 8 requirements. As noted by Cory J. in Quebec
(Attorney General) v. C.B.C.,62 once statutory conditions for issuing a
warrant are met, the issuing justice or judge must still determine whether
to exercise his or her discretion in favour of issuing the authorization.
This discretion can only be exercised after taking into account a final
delicate balance between the competing interests of the state and the
individual’s right to privacy. 63 These comments were made in the
context of a section 487 warrant that does not include the subject phrase.
In other words, section 8 always requires the balance adverted to by
reference to the “best interests” of justice language. In light of this fact,
despite its inclusion in section 487.01 (and some other search provisions),
query its necessity? Perhaps it is just a friendly reminder to the justice,
in some search provisions, to engage in the final constitutionally required
balance.
Parliament chose the general warrant as the vehicle within which to
absorb the need to provide for judicial authorization for video-warrants.
Section 487.01(4) and (5) is the legislative response to R. v. Wong.64 It
provides for a warrant that allows a peace officer to observe a person by
means of a video camera where he or she is “engaged in activity in
circumstances in which the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy”.
59
R. v. Finlay, [1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48, at 70 (Ont. C.A.), per Martin J.A.,
leave to appeal refused [1986] 1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
60
R. v. Bernardo, [1997] O.J. No. 5091, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 123, at 131 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Briggs,
[2001] O.J. No. 3339, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 38, at paras. 47-50 (Ont. C.A.), per Weiler J.A.
61
[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986]
1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
62
[1991] S.C.J. No. 87, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 517 (S.C.C.).
63
[1991] S.C.J. No. 87, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 517, at 533-34 (S.C.C.), per Cory J.; C.B.C. v. New
Brunswick (Attorney General), [1991] S.C.J. No. 88, 67 C.C.C. (3d) 544, at 560-61 (S.C.C.), per
Cory J.; R. v. C.B.C., [2001] O.J. No. 706, 52 O.R. (3d) 757 (Ont. C.A.); Baron v. Canada, [1993]
S.C.J. No. 6, 78 C.C.C. (3d) 510 (S.C.C.).
64
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.).
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The provision requires that the judge “shall” place such terms and
conditions on the warrant as is considered advisable to “ensure the
privacy of the person or of any other person” as much as possible.65
Despite its decision to place the R. v. Wong66 video amendment in
Part XV of the Criminal Code,67 Parliament heeded La Forest J.’s
approach to video surveillance and approached it like other forms of
electronic surveillance cared for in Part VI of the Code. As such,
particular note must be made of section 487.01(5), incorporating by
reference, aspects of Part VI of the Criminal Code. Among others,
section 487.01(5) incorporates sections 183, 184.2, 185 and 186 of the
Criminal Code with such “modifications as required”. This means that
all of the safeguards applicable to electronic surveillance, built into Part
VI of the Code, are applicable to video-warrants. For instance, where
there is a consenting party for the video capture, the s. 184.2 requirements
apply. Note, though, that the warrant issues under section 487.01 of
the Code, meaning that, unlike other forms of electronic participant
surveillance in Part VI, a “best interests of the administration of justice”
criterion applies to video participant surveillance. Because consent
video-warrants are governed by the requirements of section 184.2, a
police officer may bring the application.
Where there is no consenting party, the video-warrant is subject to
the same strenuous requirements of a third party authorization reviewed
above. Again, the warrant issues under section 487.01. This causes some
uncomfortable inconsistency between provisions. For instance, section
487.01(1) allows a general warrant to issue where there are sufficient
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence “has been or will be
committed”. As noted in the passage from R. v. Finlay68 set out above,
the “best interests of the administration of justice” criterion within
section 186(1)(a) has been judicially interpreted to mean reasonable
grounds to believe that “a particular offence or a conspiracy, attempt or
incitement to commit it has been, or is being, committed”. There is no
ability to access a section 186(1)(a) authorization for an anticipated offence.
It is difficult to reconcile this inconsistency between the provisions, or
to know what is available. As well, how do the “best interests of the
administration of justice” components within sections 186(1)(a) and
65

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487.01(4).
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.).
67
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
68
[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986]
1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
66
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487.01(1)(b) differ? Do they mean different things in these different
contexts? How does a judge exercise his or her discretion properly?
Moreover, based on the application of sections 185 and 186, a designated
agent must be the applicant and only a superior court judge can issue a
video-warrant. This is in contradistinction to section 487.01 warrants
which can be applied for by peace officers and issued by either provincial
or superior court judges. Confusion often attends on these applications.
That confusion arises out of the legislative means chosen by Parliament
to respond to the Court’s comments in R. v. Wong.69

VI. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. FEGAN AND THEN THERE WERE
DIGITAL NUMBER RECORDERS
The issue in R. v. Fegan70 was whether it constituted an unreasonable
search and seizure, within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, when
Bell Canada attached a digital number recorder (“DNR”) to Mr. Fegan’s
home telephone, to record numbers dialled to and from that telephone,
in an effort to determine whether he was responsible for making certain
calls.71 Justice Finlayson concluded that, in the circumstances of the case,
there was no state actor involved in the application of the DNR and,
therefore, the Charter did not apply. However, the clear implication of
the judgment was that state actors engaging in similar conduct would be
held to account under section 8. In other words, individuals have a privacy
interest in the numbers dialled to and from their phones.
Close on the heels of R. v. Fegan72 came section 492.2 of the
Criminal Code.73 Interestingly, this provision, unlike search provisions
in the Criminal Code that predated it, only required that the issuing
“justice” have reasonable grounds to “suspect that an offence ... has
been or will be committed and that information that would assist in the
investigation of the offence could be obtained through the use of a
number recorder”.74 Where these circumstances prevail, a justice may
69

[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.).
[1993] O.J. No. 733, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.).
71
R. v. Fegan, [1993] O.J. No. 733, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.).
72
[1993] O.J. No. 733, 80 C.C.C. (3d) 356 (Ont. C.A.).
73
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18.
74
Section 492.2(2) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 maintains that where the
circumstances referred to in subsection (1) exist, a justice may order anyone possessing a record of
a telephone number originated or received or intended to be received at a certain number, to provide
the record to a person named in the order.
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issue a DNR for up to 60 days. This was Parliament’s first clear and
intentional shift away from the Hunter v. Southam75 reasonable grounds
to believe threshold in the criminal context.
In R. v. Monney,76 Iacobucci J. commented on the suspicion threshold
used and found to be constitutionally acceptable in the Customs Act77
context:
Dickson C.J. also referred to the caveat expressed in the reasons in
Hunter that the reasonableness of a search must be assessed in context.
The relevant qualification of the reasonableness standard as stated in
Hunter is that the standard of reasonableness is subject to change
“[w]here the state’s interest is not simply law enforcement as, for
instance, where state security is involved, or where the individual’s
interest is not simply [an] expectation of privacy as, for instance, when
the search threatens ... bodily integrity” (p. 168) Adopting a contextual
approach to the assessment of reasonableness for the purposes of s. 8,
the Court concluded in Simmons that the degree of personal privacy
reasonably expected at border crossings is lower than would otherwise
be available in a wholly domestic setting. 78

DNR’s are used in a “wholly domestic setting” and for criminal
investigations. Yet Parliament chose to use this standard in section
492.2 of the Code. While the suspicion threshold is incapable of exact
definition, it is, undoubtedly, an easier standard to achieve than reasonable
grounds to believe. As noted in R. v. Monney, reasonable grounds to
suspect “can be viewed as a lesser but included standard in the threshold of
reasonable and probable grounds to believe”.79

75

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
[1999] S.C.J. No. 18, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.).
77
R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (2nd Supp.).
78
R. v. Monney, [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 35 (S.C.C.). See also:
R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] S.C.J. No. 25, 55 C.C.C. (3d) 530, at 542-43 (S.C.C.), per
Wilson J.; Hunter v. Southam, [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97, at 113-14 (S.C.C.),
per Dickson J.; R. v. Briggs, [2001] O.J. No. 3339, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 38, at para. 32 (Ont. C.A.).
79
R. v. Monney, [1999] S.C.J. No. 18, 133 C.C.C. (3d) 129, at para. 49 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Jacques, [1996] S.C.J. No. 88, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
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The particular legislative construct chosen for section 492.2 was
Parliament’s way of recognizing the need for judicial authorization to
allow for the installation of a DNR, while at the same time reflecting the
diminished expectation of privacy in number recorder data. In other
words, while an individual has a privacy interest in this data, the suspicion
threshold was perhaps a reflection of Parliament’s less than convinced
attitude that it was a strong privacy interest deserving of a full Hunter v.
Southam80 standard.
Parliament may have been wrong on this, yet only time will tell.
So far, the suspicion threshold has been successfully challenged as
constitutionally insufficient in R. v. Nguyen.81 Justice Halfyard concluded
that the Hunter v. Southam82 standard must always apply in criminal
investigations. Relying on a comment of La Forest J. in Thomson
Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, “when the state seeks information ... in the
course of a criminal investigation ... the citizen has a very high expectation
of privacy in respect of such investigation”, Halfyard J. concluded that
the “Hunter standards must apply” to DNRs.83
In an opposite result, the Quebec Superior Court has upheld the
provision as constitutionally sufficient in R. v. Whitman-Langille.84 In
this case, Cohen J. concluded that she saw “nothing in the Hunter
decision nor in the other jurisprudence ... that would require the same
standard of belief in the case of number recorder warrants as is required
for wiretaps”.85 She based her conclusion on both the early stage of the
investigation when DNRs are typically used and the skeletal data available
with the use of this investigative tool.86 This decision was upheld on appeal.
Justice Hilton emphasized the contextual approach to section 8 and held:
... It is an exaggeration to assimilate the information of a telephone
number and the duration that a telephone is off the hook with anything
80

[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
[2004] B.C.J. No. 247, 2004 BCSC 76 (B.C.S.C.).
82
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
83
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, 54 C.C.C. (3d) 417, at 476-77
(S.C.C.), per La Forest J. Justice Halfyard also relied upon R. v. Grant, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98, 84
C.C.C. (3d) 173, at 187 (S.C.C.) in coming to this conclusion. See R. v. Nguyen, [2004] B.C.J. No. 247,
2004 BCSC 76, at paras. 25-30 (B.C.S.C.).
84
[2004] Q.J. no 14164 (Que. S.C.).
85
R. v. Whitman-Langille, [2004] Q.J. no 14164, at para. 25 (Que. S.C.).
86
In fact, DNRs are often used in an effort to glean enough investigative fact to get the
police to the next level of authorization. By way of example, a s. 492.2 (of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46) DNR is often engaged to determine telephone numbers of individuals and
associations between individuals before a wiretap application can be made.
81
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that can reasonably be considered so “private” so as to require the
highest standard of protection of section 8 of the Canadian Charter,
especially when the information does not indicate which person is
using the telephone, whether there was a conversation, and if so, with
whom the conversation is taking place, as well as its details. 87

What is interesting about the suspicion threshold contained within
section 492.2, is that it stands in stark contrast with section 487 of the Code.
It leaves a situation where, if officers wish to obtain historical phone
records, they must obtain a section 487 search warrant, informed by
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been or is being
committed. But, if the same officer wishes to obtain future phone records,
on a go-forward basis, he or she must only demonstrate reasonable
suspicion that an offence has been, is being, or will be committed. One
might reasonably suggest that these fluctuating standards not only inject
a sense of confusion, but are difficult to reconcile from a constitutional
perspective.
In addition, in its haste to legislate, Parliament only provided a “justice”
with jurisdiction to authorize a DNR. “Justice” is defined in section 2 of
the Code as a justice of the peace or a provincial court judge. Absent
provincial legislation, superior court judges have no jurisdiction to issue
this type of warrant. This creates substantial problems where rolled-up
applications are required to be brought before a superior court judge.
For instance, where an officer is seeking a DNR to complement a wiretap
authorization, in some provinces, superior court judges cannot make
both orders.88 It appears that, in its possible exuberance to demonstrate
its view of the minimal privacy interest engaged by DNR information,
thereby leaving this type of prior authorization to lower courts, Parliament
may have created some unintentional jurisdictional hurdles.

87

R. v. Cody, [2007] Q.J. no 11001, 2007 QCCA 1276, at para. 25 (Que. C.A.).
In Ontario, this jurisdictional issue is resolved by s. 5 of the Justices of the Peace Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. J.4, which says: “Every judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court of
Canada, the Court of Appeal, the Superior Court of Justice and every provincial judge is by virtue
of his or her office a justice of the peace and also has power to do alone whatever two or more
justices of the peace are authorized to do together.” Some provinces do not have similar provincial
legislation.
88
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VII. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. WISE AND THEN THERE WERE
TRACKING WARRANTS
In R. v. Wise,89 the Court was invited to accept a Crown concession
that the installation of a tracking device inside a vehicle constituted an
unreasonable search within the meaning of section 8, as there was no
prior judicial authorization. In accepting this concession, Cory J., for
the majority, concluded that while the installation and monitoring of the
tracking device invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy, it was only
minimally intrusive. This finding was, in part, based on Cory J.’s
observation that the tracking device in question was highly rudimentary
and was installed in a motor vehicle, where there is a significantly reduced
reasonable expectation of privacy.90 Justice Cory gave legislative direction
in the following comments:
I agree with my colleague that it would be preferable if the installation
of tracking devices and the subsequent monitoring of vehicles were
controlled by legislation. I would also agree that this is a less intrusive
means of surveillance than electronic audio or video surveillance.
Accordingly, a lower standard such as a “solid ground” for suspicion
would be a basis for obtaining an authorization from an independent
authority, such as a justice of the peace, to install a device and monitor
the movements of a vehicle.91

On the heels of R. v. Wise92 came section 492.1 of the Criminal
Code.93 As with the DNR warrant provision, Parliament decided to
attach a minimal threshold of reasonable grounds to suspect. Section
492.1 permits a tracking warrant to issue where there exist reasonable
grounds to suspect that an offence has been or will be committed, and
that “information that is relevant to the commission of the offence,
including the whereabouts of any person, can be obtained through the
use of a tracking device”. Where the justice is satisfied that these
circumstances exist, he or she can authorize the installation, maintenance
and removal of a tracking device “in or on any thing, including a thing

89

[1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
In fact, the tracking device used in this case was so rudimentary that on the evening
when Mr. Wise toppled a million-dollar communications tower, the police had the wrong motor
vehicle under surveillance because the beeper device was so inaccurate.
91
R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at 229 (S.C.C.), per Cory J.
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[1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
93
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. S.C. 1993, c. 40, s. 18.
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carried, used or worn by any person”.94 Like the DNR, only a justice
may issue this type of authorization for up to 60 days.
Based on the comments of Cory J. in R. v. Wise,95 Parliament clearly
felt comfortable setting out a suspicion threshold. Query whether
the constitutional threshold should fluctuate depending on where the
installation is being made? What about the motor vehicle that has to be
removed from private property to effect the installation? What about
where the tracking device is actually installed in something “worn” or
“carried” by the person being tracked? Once the installation is complete
and the state is truly “tracking” the whereabouts of the person, the
privacy interest is arguably attenuated. The live constitutional question
surrounds what must take place in order to get to the stage where the
state can effectively track the individual. It is somewhat ironic that
police officers may only get authorization to enter a car to conduct a
search under section 487 of the Code, on the basis of reasonable
grounds to believe, yet may enter the same vehicle to install a tracking
device on the basis of reasonable grounds to suspect.
Moreover, a general warrant under section 487.01 of the Code to
enter a motor vehicle to engage in an investigative technique, may only
be issued by a provincial or superior court judge. Yet a justice of the
peace may authorize entry to install a tracking device (section 492.1).
As well, while a justice of the peace may order entry into a private place
under section 487 to permit the seizure of a tangible item, the item to be
seized may only relate to an offence that has been or is being committed.
Yet, the same justice may authorize entry into the same private place to
surreptitiously install a tracking device for an offence that may occur in
the future.
These legislative inconsistencies arise out of the R. v. Wise96 decision.
While Parliament was entitled to act on the comments of the Court in
Wise, lowering the threshold requirements for a judicial authorization,
it has resulted in a good deal of confusion.

94
95
96

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 492.1(1)(a).
[1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
[1992] S.C.J. No. 16, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
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VIII. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. BORDEN AND THEN THERE WERE
DNA WARRANTS
In R. v. Borden,97 the Supreme Court was asked to assess the
constitutionality of a “consent” seizure of bodily substances taken from
a suspect in an investigation. The consent was found to be constitutionally
lacking as Mr. Borden was not informed of all the purposes the state had
in mind for his DNA sample. (At the time it was taken, the officers
knew that they would use the bodily sample to compare Mr. Borden’s DNA
in relation to a crime and crime scene sample he was not apprised of.)98
As a result, the taking of his bodily substance, without lawful consent,
constituted a section 8 Charter breach. As noted by Iacobucci J.: “the
respondent had an expectation of privacy with respect to his bodily
integrity and the informational content of his blood.”99
DNA “information” was much too valuable to leave without a
proper legislative tool to permit seizure. What resulted in the wake of
R. v. Borden100 was an intricate legislative scheme, carefully crafted to
permit the seizure of bodily substances directly from the body, while at
the same time attending to and caring for the heightened privacy interest
engaged. Sections 487.04-09 represented Parliament’s attempt to set up
a scheme that set out the constitutional requirements that must be met
before a DNA warrant issues and the procedures that must attend the
execution of the warrant.101
In brief compass, a provincial court judge may issue a DNA warrant
when satisfied, pursuant to section 487.05(1), that there exist reasonable
grounds to believe that an offence designated in section 487.04 has been
committed, that a bodily substance related to the commission of the

97

[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.).
The Supreme Court of Canada later acknowledged in R. v. Arp, [1998] S.C.J. No. 82,
129 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) that to constitute a s. 8 compliant, fully informed consent, officers
need only inform the accused of what they know at the time the consent sample is taken. In other
words, officers are not held to a standard of clairvoyance when informing an accused of the
purposes for which a DNA sample will be used. Once the state lawfully possesses that sample,
taken with a lawful and informed consent, it can be used for other purposes in the future, unknown at
the time the sample was taken. Of course, the ratio in Arp must be read in conjunction with s. 487.09
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, requiring the destruction of bodily samples in certain
specified instances.
99
R. v. Borden, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404, at 417 (S.C.C.), per Iacobucci J.
100
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.).
101
An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Young Offenders Act (forensic DNA analysis),
S.C. 1995, c. 27, s. 1.
98
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offence has been found,102 that the person from whom the DNA sample
is sought was “a party to the offence” and that forensic DNA analysis of
the person’s bodily substance will provide “evidence” about whether the
crime scene sample was from that person.103 Under section 487.05(2) the
justice must be satisfied that there is a person qualified to take the
sample. Section 487.06 sets out the types of samples that may be taken
and section 487.07 sets out the mandatory procedures required to be
followed when executing the order. This includes providing the subject
of the warrant with privacy and providing him or her with information
about the warrant and process being executed. Section 487.08 sets out
the use to which bodily samples and DNA profiles taken from that sample
can be put, as well as creating an offence for a use not articulated in the
provision. Section 487.09 sets out the circumstances under which samples
taken pursuant to warrant and the profiles that result must be destroyed.
There is no question that, other than Part VI of the Criminal Code,104
no other provision in the Code is as demanding. This is likely owing to
Parliament’s appreciation for the heightened privacy interest attached to
bodily substances.105 Even so, in R. v. B. (S.A.),106 the appellant suggested
that section 8 (and section 7) demanded more than the scheme required.
For instance, the appellant said that a Hunter v. Southam107 reasonable
grounds to believe threshold was insufficient. In rejecting this argument,
Arbour J. noted that the “standard of ‘reasonable grounds’ is well
recognized in the law and I see no reason to adopt a higher one in the
case of DNA warrants”.108
The appellant also maintained that investigative necessity, similar to
section 186(1)(b), should be required before a DNA warrant issue. Justice
Arbour, on behalf of the court, rejected this argument. She held that the
legislative scheme that responded to R. v. Borden109 was sufficient to
102
This includes on or within the body of the victim, on anything worn by or carried by the
victim, or on or within the body of any person or thing or at any place “associated with the
commission of the offence”. See s. 487.05(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
103
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 487.05(1) (a)-(d).
104
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
105
This heightened privacy interest was acknowledged in R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34,
113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) and has been repeatedly confirmed since that time. As recently as
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 2004 SCC 67 (S.C.C.), Binnie J. commented on the hierarchy
of privacy interests, placing bodily substances at the top of the privacy pile (see paras. 21-22).
106
[2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
107
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
108
R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 55 (S.C.C.).
109
[1994] S.C.J. No. 82, 92 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (S.C.C.).
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meet all constitutional requirements. In doing so, she read the “best
interests of the administration of justice” requirement within section 487.05
as precluding a “judge from issuing a warrant where it is unnecessary
to do so”.110

IX. FIRST THERE WAS R. V. STILLMAN AND THEN THERE WERE
IMPRESSION WARRANTS
On two separate occasions, while he was detained in custody, teeth
impressions were taken from Mr. Stillman without his consent. On the
second occasion, the process took almost two hours. Justice Cory found
that this constituted a significant section 8 (and section 7) Charter breach.
He concluded that the seizure of “bodily samples [and impressions] was
highly intrusive. It violated the sanctity of the body which is essential to
the maintenance of human dignity. It was the ultimate invasion of the
appellant’s privacy.”111 As such, the need for legislation was clear.112
The same year R. v. Stillman113 was released, Parliament enacted
what is now section 487.092, permitting a search warrant to issue for the
seizure of a “handprint, fingerprint, footprint, foot impression, teeth
impression or other print or impression of the body or any part of the
body”, where a justice is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that an offence has been committed and that “information
concerning the offence will be obtained by the print or impression”. The
justice must be further satisfied that such a warrant will be in the “best
interests of the administration of justice”. Pursuant to section 487.092(2),
the justice shall impose terms and conditions considered “advisable” to
ensure that the search and seizure authorized by the warrant is “reasonable
in the circumstances”.114
It is not clear what is meant by the “best interests of the administration
of justice” consideration in this provision. Could it be like the DNA
provision? We know it is not like the Part VI provision, judicially

110

R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 54 (S.C.C.), per

Arbour J.
111

R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321, at para. 51 (S.C.C.).
While R. v. Stillman, [1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.) also discussed
the Charter issues invovled in the warrantless seizure of bodily substances, by the time it was argued in
the Supreme Court of Canada, the DNA search warrant provisions had already been enacted.
113
[1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
114
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as am. 1997, c. 18, s. 45; 1998, c. 37, s. 23.
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defined in R. v. Finlay115 as reasonable grounds to believe, as it would be
repetitious. Note that despite the strong Charter interests articulated in
R. v. Stillman,116 a justice of the peace may issue an impression warrant.
It is one thing to speak in terms of hand and footprints, but it is an
entirely different constitutional question when authorizing the print or
impression of a more private area of the body, as is permitted under the
provision. This means that while a justice of the peace may authorize
the taking of an impression of a highly private area of the body, he or
she cannot authorize the taking of a bodily substance, that involves a
comparatively minimally intrusive procedure.117

X. ENOUGH DIALOGUE
There has been a great deal written about Charter dialogue between
the courts and legislatures. As noted by Binnie J. in Little Sisters Book
and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), the court has
“frequently recognized the importance of fostering a dialogue between
courts and the legislatures”.118 The proliferation of search provisions in
the Criminal Code,119 coinciding with the release or anticipated release
of important section 8 judgments, is a testament to the fact that dialogue
works.120 In the case of provisions providing for prior authorization,
perhaps it is working too well.
While dialogue between the courts and legislatures is generally
considered a desirable result, it has led to somewhat of a knee-jerk
reaction in the area of section 8.121 In striving to craft legislation that
115
[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986]
1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
116
[1997] S.C.J. No. 34, 113 C.C.C. (3d) 321 (S.C.C.).
117
See R. v. F. (S.), [2000] O.J. No. 60, 141 C.C.C. (3d) 225, at para. 27 (Ont. C.A.), per
Finlayson J.A.; R. v. Rodgers, [2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 207 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (S.C.C.).
118
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] S.C.J. No. 66,
[2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, at para. 268 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J.; R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 57 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hall, [2002] S.C.J. No. 65, 167 C.C.C. (3d) 449, at paras.
43-44 (S.C.C.). See also Peter Hogg & Allison Bushell, Charter Dialogue Between Courts and
Legislatures (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Kent Roach, “Constitutional and Common Law
Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 481.
119
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
120
Kent Roach made this observation in his article “Constitutional and Common Law
Dialogues Between the Supreme Court and Canadian Legislatures” (2001) 80 Can. Bar. Rev. 481.
121
This is not to mention the many search warrant and authorization provisions that
have been enacted since 1984, outside of a direct response to judicial decisions. (For instance,
ss. 487.011-487.017 were recently enacted (S.C. 2004, c. 3, s. 7) to allow for production orders to
be directed at people to produce documents, copies of documents and bank-related information.) As
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responds to section 8 concerns articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada,
Parliament has introduced unnecessary complexity into the Criminal
Code.122 Officers are forced to debate which section of the Code governs
their proposed investigative technique and which legislative demands,
including jurisdictional concerns, apply. Bearing in mind the observations
of Dickson J. in Hunter v. Southam123 about the need for a contextual
approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the manner in which
it can be overtaken, it would be naive to think that all of the complexities
could be removed by providing for one simple “über provision”. While
some provisions could be condensed into a single section, the reality is
that fluctuating privacy thresholds do not permit a single overriding
provision. In short, some of the complexities embedded in the Criminal
Code are unavoidable.
With that said, there is clearly room for improvement. What follows
are only some limited suggestions about, at a minimum, tweaking the
authorization provisions to allow for a more coherent and simpler
approach.124

XI. THERE HAS TO BE A BETTER WAY
1. Move the Video-Warrant Provision to Where It Belongs
R. v. Wong125 maintained that video surveillance is akin to other
forms of electronic surveillance. It does not belong in Part XV of the
Criminal Code.126 This is clear by virtue of the fact that Parliament had
to adopt, by reference, among others, sections 183, 184.2, 185 and 186
well, the DNA data bank sections, enacted by the proclamation of Bills C-3 and S-10 on June 30,
2000, while not in response to a judicial decision, are critically important search provisions: ss.
487.04-091. It should be noted that this paper has intentionally steered away from discussing home
entry warrants to effect an arrest (ss. 529-529.5 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46). These
provisions were enacted in direct response to the decision of R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49,
115 C.C.C. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.), but, strictly speaking, are not used as investigative tools.
122
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
123
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.).
124
For some years now, the federal government has had the Lawful Access initiative. See
online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/la_al/summary/index.html>; <http://www.justice.gc.ca/
en/cons/la_al/>. While it has come close a few times, the initiative has not yet resulted in complete
legislation. This ongoing legislative initiative has been looking at some of the issues raised and
would be a perfect vehicle to address some of the complexities and deficiencies in the Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
125
[1990] S.C.J. No. 118, 60 C.C.C. (3d) 460 (S.C.C.).
126
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
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of the Code. Barring a participant surveillance video, these are Crown
agent applications. They are driven by considerations unique to Part VI
of the Code. The jurisdiction to issue a video-warrant should reside in
that Part of the Code. In fact, it should simply be merged into the preexisting provisions. Locating the video-warrant provision in Part VI
would remove confusion in this area and ensure that the provision properly
reflects the enhanced privacy interest recognized in Wong.
2. “Best Interests of the Administration of Justice”
This term introduces significant confusion into the Code. It is unclear
what it means. The only thing we know for sure, as acknowledged by
Martin J.A. in R. v. Finlay,127 is that it means different things in different
contexts. This is really nothing more than an acknowledgment of basic
section 8 principles, that an issuing justice must balance all interests
concerned, including the state’s interest in law enforcement and the
individual’s interest in privacy, when determining whether to issue
process. If this is what it means, though, then is it not correct that each
search provision in the Code should contain this constitutional requirement?
Why only some? Is it only worth reminding justices and judges to engage
in this required balance in some contexts? If this discretion is inextricably
linked to the exercise of judicial discretion, then adding the words “best
interests of the administration of justice” is redundant and adds confusion
that is unnecessary and duplicitous. The confusion in this area could be
resolved by removing this phraseology from the provisions altogether.
The one exception is section 186(1)(a) of the Code. In R. v. Finlay,128
“best interests of the administration of justice” was interpreted to mean
“reasonable grounds to believe”. This provision should be amended by
replacing the “best interests” language with the specific threshold test for
issuance.

127

[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986]
1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
128
[1985] O.J. No. 2680, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 48 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [1986]
1 S.C.R. ix (S.C.C.).
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3. Make All Warrants and Judicial Authorizations Available for
Past, Current and Future Offences
Currently, there are a number of provisions that do not permit seizures
or surveillance where an offence is anticipated to occur in the future. For
instance, section 186(1)(a) of the Code, setting out the “best interests”
test, has been judicially interpreted as reasonable grounds to believe an
offence has been or is being committed. This stands in direct contrast to
section 184.2 of the Code permitting a participant surveillance authorization
in circumstances where there exist grounds to believe an offence will
occur in the future. Section 487 of the Code does not accommodate
tangible seizures in relation to offences anticipated to occur in the
future. This stands in stark contrast with other warrant provisions, such
as DNRs, tracking warrants and general warrants. In fact, the general
warrant, section 487.01, is often used for tangible seizures, where an
offence is anticipated in the future, because section 487 will not
accommodate such a seizure. There is no constitutional reason supporting
this distinction. It should be remedied by making all forms of prior
judicial authorization available for anticipated offences.129
4. Collapse the Search Provisions
There is no reason that we need to have so many provisions dealing
with prior authorization: regular warrants, general warrants, production
orders, DNA warrants, tracking warrants, DNR orders, impression warrants
and the like. Renee Pomerance suggested a collapse of sections 487, 487.01
and 487.091 (now section 487.092).130 This makes good sense. I would
add to this list the new production orders. The production scheme, sections
487.011-487.017, was added to the Code in an effort to allow third parties
to produce documents and information sought by the police, instead of
the police searching for those items. The reality is that this ability already
existed. In fact, until the production orders were enacted, sections 487
and 487.01, with the use of an assistance order under section 487.02,
were widely used to have innocent third parties, such as banks and
129

It should be noted that there are a few types of authorizations which are not conducive to
anticipatory offences. By way of example, the grounds for DNA and impression warrants are
informed by whether there exists a crime scene “sample” of either DNA or an impression that will
be conducive to comparison.
130
Renee Pomerance, “Criminal Code Search Warrants: A Plea for a New Generic Warrant”
in Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law, Dan Stuart, R.J. Delisle & Allan Manson, eds.
(Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 1999).
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telecommunication companies, collect documents and information and
provide it to the police under warrant.131 While there are certain helpful
aspects to the production order scheme, such as the ability to require a
person to whom the order is directed to “prepare a document based on
documents or data already in existence and produce it”, there is no
reason that this power could not be absorbed into the larger and more
comprehensive warrant provision.132
As a result of the lower constitutional threshold brought to bear on
DNR and tracking warrants, it would be difficult to absorb them within
a larger provision consolidating other search powers. At a minimum,
though, they should be distilled into a single provision, allowing for any
technique to be used to track a target and to gather DNR information. If
these warrants were to be absorbed into the larger provision, it would be
important to recognize the fluctuating threshold of grounds to suspect.
DNA warrants should likely remain a free-standing warrant. This is
owing to the fact that they reside within a complex and sophisticated
legislative framework, creating powers and responsibilities in relation to
the execution and post-execution phase of the warrant, including the state’s
significant responsibilities respecting the DNA sample. It is difficult
to imagine breaking these warrants off from the legislative scheme that
bootstraps their constitutionality.133 As well, the DNA data bank provisions
are inextricably linked to that legislative scheme. Severing off DNA
warrants could result in confusion for the data bank provisions.134

131
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Canada, [1997] O.J. No. 5573 (Ont. Gen. Div.);
Re Canada (Department of National Revenue), [1998] O.J. No. 3517, 56 C.R.R. (2d) 145
(Ont. Prov. Ct.).
132
It is noted that there is a problem with s. 487.012(3)(a) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-46, setting out the requirements for issuance of a production order. It requires that there
exist reasonable grounds to believe that “an offence ... has been or is suspected to have been
committed”. In other words, a “justice or judge” must have reasonable grounds to believe that an
offence is suspected to have been committed. At a minimum, even if the production order remains a
free-standing provision in the Code, this confusion must be resolved. Also, note the difference
between the requirements that the offence “has been” committed in s. 487.012 and reasonable
grounds to believe that “an offence ... has been or will be committed” within s. 487.013.
133
R. v. B. (S.A.), [2003] S.C.J. No. 61, 178 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (S.C.C.).
134
See R. v. Briggs, [2001] O.J. No. 3339, 157 C.C.C. (3d) 38 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Rodgers,
[2006] S.C.J. No. 15, 207 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (S.C.C.); ss. 487.04-487.091 of the Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46; DNA Identification Act, S.C. 1998, c. 37, as am. S.C. 2000, c. 10, ss. 4-12 and
amended further.
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5. Allow a Judge Issuing a Wiretap Authorization to Order Anything
That Will Assist in Giving Effect to That Authorization
Currently, wiretap authorizations are exceptionally complex. This
is, in part, related to the fact that the issuing judge must make multiple
orders to assist in giving effect to the authorization. By way of example,
DNR orders always attach to a wiretap authorization as it is important to
receive information about numbers dialled and received simultaneous to
the interception of communications. As well, tracking warrants usually
accompany a wiretap authorization, permitting vehicles that have a probe
installed to be tracked simultaneously with communications being
intercepted. General warrants and the like are also, often, part of the
package. While an omnibus order often results from the application, it
still requires the issuing judge to have regard to the specific legislative
criteria attaching to each form of authorization.
This should be simplified for purposes of Part VI of the Criminal
Code.135 Any judge allowing for an authorization under Part VI should
be granted the power, pursuant to that Part, to order anything that will
assist in giving effect to the authorization. There are no constitutional
concerns with such an approach, given that the strong requirements for a
wiretap authorization must first be met before any ancillary activity may
be ordered. This is a simple and practical manner in which to address
these often complex and difficult judicial exercises.
6. Allow a Superior Court Judge to Issue Any Warrant or
Authorization
Regardless of how many warrant provisions result from a consolidated
approach, it is important that superior court judges be provided with the
jurisdiction to grant all warrants and authorizations under the Code.
Right now, the fact that a superior court judge cannot grant a DNA
warrant, by way of example, is troublesome. It means that the same judge
who grants a wiretap authorization which leads to sufficient grounds to get
a DNA warrant, cannot issue the latter warrant. This leads to unacceptable
inefficiencies and should be remedied. There is no constitutional reason
for the exclusion of judges of the superior court.

135
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XII. CONCLUSION
A lot has happened in the last quarter-century. While scientific and
technological aspects of investigations have taken off, section 8 of the
Charter has taken root. This has had a rather profound impact on the
Criminal Code136 and Parliament’s attempt to keep stride with the Court’s
approach to privacy interests. Parliament cannot be faulted for enacting
provisions to ensure that the police community has the tools available to
it to advance important investigative work. Nonetheless, this approach
has resulted in some unnecessary inconsistencies and complexities. It is
important, at this quarter-century mark, to take stock and see how we
can go forward in a more coherent manner.
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R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.

